The Status of Opposition Fighters in a NonInternational Armed Conflict by Schmitt, Michael N.
VI 
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Michael N. Schmitt' 
The treaty law appl.icable to the classification of participants in a non-international conflict is limited to Common Artide 3 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions l and the 1977 Additional Protocol ILl The former is generally 
deemed reflective of customary international law, whereas the latter is not (al-
though certain individual provisions thereof certainly are)) Other treaties apply 
during non-international armed conflicts, but do not bear on the issue of classify-
ing those involved in the conflict.4 
Common Article 3, which appears in each of the four Geneva Conventions. pro-
vides no specific guidance as to who qualifies as a "Party to the conflict," although 
subsequent case law has clarified that the article encompasses conflict at a certain 
level of intensity that occurs between a State's armed forces and organized armed 
groups, or between such groups.5 Textually, the article merely refers to "persons 
taking no active part in hostilities," including "members of the armed forces" who 
are 1I0rs de combat.6 The reference is somewhat useful in that it suggests a norma-
tive distinction between those who actively participate in a non-international 
armed conflict and those who do not. Yet, the failure to address party status 
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directly is unfortunate, for it begs the question of when non-State individuals or 
groups qualify as a party. Complicating the issue of participant classification is the 
fact that Common Article 3 makes no mention of the category "civilians." 
Additional Protocol II contains slightly more granularity in its provision on the 
instrument's material field of application. Article 1 extends coverage to "all armed 
conflicts" between the armed forces of a State party to the Protocol and "dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible com-
mand, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this ProtocoL'" 
This is a higher threshold of applicability than that of Common Article 3 in two re-
gards.8 First, it does not include conflicts that are solely between organized armed 
groups; a State must be involved.9 Second, the group in opposition to the govern-
ment must exercise a certain degree of control over terri tory. The higher thresholds 
are not dealt with in this chapter, as they bear on the law that applies to a conflict, 
not on the status of its participants. What is significant with regard to classification 
of participants, though, are the references to dissident armed forces and organized 
armed groups. 
Additional Protocol II also adopts the notion of "civilian," most notably in Ar-
ticle 13 on the "protection of the civilian population." That article extends "gen-
eral protection against the dangers arising from military operations" to civilians, 
and specifically prohibits both attacks against them and any actions intended to 
terrorize the civilian population, but withdraws said protection "for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostili ties."lo Unfortunately, Additional Protocol II, in 
contrast to its international armed conflict counterpart, offers no definition of the 
term "civilian."11 
Taking the two treaties together, and in light of Common Article 3's customary 
status, it can be concluded that two broad categories of non-international armed 
conflict participants lie in juxtaposition: civilians and organized armed groups. 
The former can be subdivided into those who directly participate in hostilities and 
those who do not. Organized armed groups consist of a State's armed forces, dissi-
dent armed forces or "other" organized armed groups. 
This chapter examines the three types of "opposition fighters" ---dissident 
armed fo rces, other organized armed groups and civilians directly participating 
in hostilities. A companion contribution to the volume deals with the status of 
government fighte rs. The chapter does not address the criteria fo r the existence 
of a non-international armed conflict, the subject of other con tributions, except 
as that topic bears on classificat ion of participants. 12 Accordingly, it does not 
explore such contentious topics as whether a non-international armed conflict 
can exist during a belligerent occupation, the legal status of a confli ct with 
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transnational terrorists, internationalization of a conflict through intervention of 
another State or external State control of insurgent groups. Rather, assuming a 
non-international armed conflict (whatever form it takes), it asks how opposition 
force participants in the conilict are to be classified. I3 
The significance of classification is limited. For instance, the international 
armed conilict concept of combatancy and the related notion of belligerent im-
munitydo not exist in non-international armed conilidS. 14 Members of the oppo-
sition forces may be prosecuted for any acts that violate domestic law, even if they 
are not violations of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), as is the case with attacking 
members of the armed forces . IS In light of the absence of combatancy in a non-
international armed conflict, this chapter has adopted the term "fighters" in lieu 
of "combatants" to refer to those who participate in the conflict.16 Similarly, there 
is no prisoner of war regime in the context of a non-international armed conflict, 
although, as explained in the chapters on detention, certain basic protections do 
inure to the benefit of detainees in these conilicts. 
The key consequences of classification lie in the law of targeting, for classifica-
tion determines whether LOAC prohibits an attack on an individual during a non-
international armed conilictY To the extent no prohibition exists on attacking 
persons with a particular classification, harm to an individual within that group 
plays no role in proportionality calculations (except as military advantage) and need 
not be considered when determining the precautions that attackers are required to 
take during attacks to avoid harming civilians. 18 As will become apparent, the 
targetability of the various categories of opposition fighters is a matter of some 
contention in LOAC circles. 
Before turning to an examination of the various categories of opposition fight-
ers, it should be briefly noted that if the forces of another State intervene on behalf 
of the opposition, an international armed conflict ensues between that State and 
the State against whom the pre-existing rebellion is under way; the conflict has been 
internationalized.19 Unless the external State exercises a sufficiently high level of 
control over the opposition forces, a non- international armed conilia continues 
between those forces and their government.20 Because the external State's forces 
are involved in an international armed conilid, their status, which would be that of 
combatants, is not examined below.21 
Individuals Who Are Not Members of a "Traditional" Opposition Force 
As a general rule, individual criminals and purely criminal groups do not consti-
tute "parties" to a non- international armed conflict, regardless of whether they 
engage alone in acts of violence against the government (or non-government 
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organized anned groups) or operate in the midst of an ongoing non-international 
anned conflict. Since they neither are a party nor operate on behalf of one, domestic 
law and international human rights nonns will usually govern actions taken against 
them. 
The offidallnternational Committee of the Red Cross (JCRe) commentary on 
Common Article 3 suggests that the drafters intended to preclude its applicability 
to common criminality. Early in the drafting process, a proposal to extend the 1949 
Geneva Conventions to "all cases of armed conflict which are not of an interna-
tional character, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, 
which may occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties"22 
was met with objection on the basis that it might be interpreted as applying to situ-
ations involving "no more than a handful of rebels or common brigands."23 Fur-
ther concern was expressed about the "risk of ordinary criminals being encouraged 
to give themselves a semblance of organization as a pretext for claiming the benefit 
of the Convention, representing their crimes as 'acts of war' in order to escape pun-
ishment for them. "24 According to the commentary, numerous delegations con-
cluded that" [t Jhe expression [not of an international character] was so general, so 
vague, that ... it might be taken to cover any act committed by force of arms-any 
form of anarchy, rebellion, or even plain banditry."2s 
Proponents of the text in question were sensitive to these concerns, responding 
that " insurgents . . . are not all brigands" and "the behaviour of the insurgents in the 
field would show whether they were in fact mere felons, or, on the contrary, real 
combatants who deserved to receive protection under the Conventions. "26 The 
JCRe's non-binding and non-exclusive list of sample criteria for non-international 
armed conflicts, by making reference to "the Party in revolt against the de jure 
Government" and "insurgents," adopts the same position,27 one likewise strength-
ened by the ICRC Commentary's use elsewhere of the term "rebel Party."28 
As these examples illustrate, the law of armed conflict traditionally envisioned 
non-international armed conflict as consisting of only those activities evidencing 
some sort of politically motivated challenge to State authorities in order to attain 
political control and authority or displace those of the government. However, the 
evolving nature of criminality has brought this traditional understanding into 
question. 
Consider the criminal gangs active in Colombia and Mexico.29 They field forces 
today that often outgun the regular armed fo rces. Unlike brigands, bandits and 
other criminals who merely take advantage of the instability characterizing armed 
conflict, these gangs directly challenge State authori ties in order to create zones in 
which they can with impunity pursue their criminal activities. The respective gov-
ernments must resort to mili tary fo rce to counter the organizations, civilians are 
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placed at great risk from the ensuing hostilities and criminal gangs often control 
wide swaths of territory. 
In other words, these are situations in which criminal gangs are highly orga-
nized and conduct hostilities with the government at a level of intensity consis-
tent with the existence of a non-international armed confljct. There is li ttle to 
distinguish them from the Commentary's description of Common Article 3 non-
international armed conflicts as "armed conflicts, with armed forces on either 
side engaged in hostilities--conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar 
to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single country."30 
To the extent that the law of non-international armed conflict frees States to deal 
militarily with high-order political violence through application of LOAC con-
duct of hostilities rules, the same rationale would justify application to suffi-
ciently organized and intense criminal activity directed against the State. Such an 
interpretation would be consistent with the assertion in the commentary on 
Common Article 3 that "the scope of application of the Article must be as wide as 
possible."3l Accordingly, it is at least arguable that in light of the context and 
nature of the criminal armed activities States face today, imposing a political 
motivation requirement, in addition to organization and intensity, for qualifica-
tion as a non-international armed conflict makes little normative or practical 
sense. 
Should members of a criminal group or individual criminals become involved 
in a non-international armed conflict on behalf of one of the parties, they would 
qualify as members of an organized armed group or direct participants in hostili-
ties, respectively, as those appellations are described below. With regard to groups, 
their activity in support of the party, considered as a whole, would have to consti-
tute what is in a sense "group participation in hostilities" before qualifying as an 
organized anned group involved in a non-international armed confljct. Key fac-
tors in such an assessment include the nature of the group's activity and its nexus to 
the conflict. For instance, if a dissident armed force that controls terri tory allows a 
criminal group to engage in criminal activities in exchange for conducting attacks 
on the State's armed forces, guarding its military facilities or providing logistics for 
its combat operations, the criminal group would be operating on the dissident 
group's behalf and therefore qualify. By way of contrast, merely paying a "tax" on 
production or transhipment of drugs to an organized armed group in control of an 
area, as is the case in Afghanistan with certain narcotics organizat ions, would not 
render the criminal group an organized armed group.32 
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Dissident Anned Forces 
The most straightforward category of opposition forces is dissident armed forces . 
As noted, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II both utilize the term 
"armed forces,» the fonner with regard to protections that attach once members 
thereof are Ilors de combat, the latter in its provision on material field of applica-
tion. The context of the Common Article 3 reference clearly implies the possibili ty 
of "armed forces" on both sides of a non-international armed conflict, since the 
relevant provision applies to "each Party to the conflict. "33 This interpretation be-
comes express with Additional Protocol II 's reference to "dissident" armed forces. 
In the latter instrument, the phrase "dissident armed forces" is used in contra-
distinction to "other organized armed groups." On this basis, it might be argued 
that "other organized anned groups" constitutes a separate category fro m dissident 
armed forces, a point with which the author disagrees since there is no meaningful 
difference in the legal regimes governing the detention or targeting of the two cate-
gories. However, acknowledging that some commentators distinguish among vari-
ous members of an "other organized group" with regard to targeting, a point to be 
discussed, this chapter treats dissident armed forces and other organized armed 
groups separately for the sake of analysis. 
What is clear is that dissident armed forces do not attain civilian status by virtue 
of their break from the State's regular military. According to the JCRe's 2009 Inter-
pretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 
Although members of dissident armed forces are no longer members of SUte armed 
forces, they do not become civilians merely because they have turned against their gov-
ernment. At least to the extent, and for as long as, they remain organized under the 
structures of the State armed forces to which they formerly belonged, these structures 
should continue to determine individual membership in dissident armed forces as 
well.34 
While other aspects of the Interpretive Guidance proved controversial, this text 
elicited no serious objection from the international experts participating in the 
draft ing process. JS 
Yet, merely having been members of the armed forces of a State does not suffice 
to qualify individuals as members of a dissident armed force. Only breakaway units 
that retain some degree of their original organizational structure qualify. )6 Fighters 
who are former members of the armed forces but have not remained with their 
units (such as deserters) are either members of o ther organized armed groups or 
civilians directly participating in hostilities. 
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Near-universal consensus exists that dissident armed forces, like members of 
the State's armed forces, are targetable at all times under the law of armed conflict. 
Stated with greater precision, it is not a violation of the lawof armed conflict to "at-
tack" themY This is evident from the plain text of Common Article 3(1), which 
protects persons who are taking no active part in hostilities from acts of violence, 
including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms or are lIors 
de combat. The only reasonable interpretation of the provision is that those mem-
bers of the armed forces who are still "in the fight" lack protection from attack un-
der LOAC during a non-international armed conflict. This position comports with 
the common understanding of the principle of distinction, which requires an at-
tacker to distinguish between combatants and civilians and direct attacks only 
against the former. The principle is universally accepted as customary law in both 
international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.38 
Although the notion of "armed forces" transcends the boundary between 
international and non-international armed conflict, its precise parameters do 
not. Plainly, members of the regular armed forces qualify as "armed forces" in a 
non-international armed conflict, as do members of the regular armed forces in re-
bellion against the State.3~ The concept of armed forces in international armed con-
flict includes "militia and volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces."40 It 
is reasonable to extend this inclusion into non-international armed conflict such 
that they would also qualify as part of the State's armed forces, or, if in rebellion, a 
component of the dissident armed forces. 
The case of paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies involved in a non-
international armed conflict is more complicated. As a matter of customary inter-
national law in international armed conflict, they may be incorporated into the 
armed forces, and thereby lose any claim to civilian status. 41 Additional Protocol I 
adds a further requirement, that incorporation be notified to the other party to the 
conflict,42 although by customary law incorporation is solely a factual matter and 
failure to so notify the enemy does not preclude such groups' treatment as mem-
bers of the armed forces for purposes of targeting and detention.43 
The situation in non-international armed conflict differs markedly. In that op-
position fighters are in violation of domestic law by virtue of their armed activities, 
law enforcement agencies necessarily engage in operations against them. Accord-
ingly, in non-international armed conflict there is no logic for incorporation; 
fighting lawlessness is the very raison d'etre of law enforcement entities, a task un-
diminished by the existence of a non-international armed conflict. Thus, even if 
wholly separate from the military, perhaps even conducting autonomous opera-
tions that are not coordinated with those of the armed forces, law enforcement and 
similar agencies qualify as the armed forces for the purposes of non-international 
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armed conflict classification. The Cotlltlletltary to Additional Protocol II explicitly 
embraces this interpretation: 
The term "armed forces" of the High Contracting Party should be understood in the 
broadest sense. In fact, this term was chosen in preference to others suggested such as, 
for example, "regular armed forces", in order to cover all the armed forces, including 
those not included in the definition of the army in the national legislation of some 
countries (national guard, customs, police forces or any other similar force).44 
To the extent any such groups--or units thereof-act in opposition to the govern-
ment, they will be considered and treated as "dissident armed forces." 
Finally, it is possible for State armed forces to be transformed into opposition 
organized armed groups once they lose power. This was the situation in Afghani-
stan upon either adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 in 
December 2001 orthe installation of Hamid Karzai as interim president during the 
June 2002 {oya jirga.45 Arguably, it is also the situation of Qaddafi's forces, at least 
from the perspective of those States, such as the United States, which have recog-
nized the Transitional National Council as the legitimate government of Libya. 
Whether former military forces qualify as a dissident armed force or "other orga-
nized armed group" is unresolved as a matter oflaw, but this is of lin Ie practical sig-
nificance in light of the position taken in this chapter that dissident armed forces 
are but a category of organized armed forces.46 
Other Organjzed Anned Groups 
A second category of opposition forces consists, for the sake of analysis, of "other 
organized armed groups," an expression drawn from the text of Additional 
Protocol II. It is well established that the existence of an armed conflict requires 
the participation of an armed force of some sort . In the context of international 
armed confli ct, this requirement poses li ttle difficulty. Armed forces of one State, 
which are organized by definition, face those of another. By contrast, the situation 
is more complex in non-international armed con fl ict, for armed conflict must 
be distinguished from "situations of internal d isturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. "47 In 
Tadii, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) made such a distinction by defining non-international armed 
conflict as situations of "protracted armed violence between governmental au-
thorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State,"48 a 
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test combining intensity and organization which has been adopted in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 49 
Until recently, it was unclear whether organized armed groups other than the 
dissident armed forces co mprise groups who are di rectly participating in 
hostilities or constitute a separate category of" non-civilians."50 Neither Common 
Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II directly addresses the scope of the concept of 
civilian. As noted, the former avoids the term altogether, instead simply extending 
protection to those taking no active part in hostilities, while the latter employs the 
term without defining it.sl 
The issue of whether members of organized armed groups are civilians or a sep-
arate category bears on the conduct of hostilities. In particular, Article 13 of Addi-
tional Protocol I, which is generally accepted as reflective of customary 
internationallaw,52 provides: 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the ob-
ject of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread 
terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time 
as they take a direct part in hostilities.53 
So, if the members are civilians, they are only targetable while participating in the 
hostilities. If not, they may be treated as analogous to members of the armed forces, 
and thereby remain targetable even when not participating. 
The ICRC acknowledged this normative dilemma in its 2005 Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law study: 
It can be argued that the terms "dissident armed fo rces or other organized armed 
groups .. . under responsible command" in Article 1 of Additional Protocol II inferen-
tially recognise the essential condi tions of armed forces, as they apply in international 
armed conflict . . .• and that it follows that civilians are all persons who are not mem-
bers of such forces or groups. Subsequent treaties, applicable to non-international 
armed conflicts, have similarly used the terms civilians and civilian population without 
defining them. 
While State armed forces are not considered civilians, practice is not clear as to whether 
members of armed opposition groups are civilians subject to Rule 6 on loss of protec-
tion from attack in case of direct participation or whether members of such groups are 
liable to attack as such, independently of the operation of Rule 6 [which deals with the 
issue of direct participation in hostilitiesJ.S4 
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This very issue occupied the attention of a group of international experts con-
vened by the ICRC from 2003 to 2008 to consider the notion of direct participation 
by civilians. Various suggestions were offered, including an approach by which 
members of an organized armed group might be treated as civilians who were con-
tinuously participating in hostilities, and therefore continuously legitimate targets. 
However, the ICRC worried that the approach would "seriously undermine the 
conceptual integrity of the categories of persons underlying the principle of distinc-
tion, most notably because it would create parties to non-international armed con-
flicts whose entire armed forces remain part of the civilian population,"ss a point 
later acknowledged by the District Court for the District of Columbia in Gherebi.56 
Accordingly, the Interpretive Guidance took the reasonable position that "as the 
wording and logic of Article 3 GC I-TV and Additional Protocol II reveals, civilians, 
armed forces, and organized armed groups of the parties to the conflict are mutu-
ally exclusive categories also in non-international armed conllict."$7 Individuals 
who are members of organized armed groups are accordingly not civilians. 58 The 
ICfY embraced this stance in Galic. S9 This is an important point, for if members of 
an organized armed group are not civilians, the LOAC extending protection to 
civilians is inapplicable to them. For instance, they may be attacked regardless of 
whether they are directly participating; their vulnerability to attack is status, not ac-
tivity, based. 
Not all groups in a battlespace are "organized armed groups." To qualify, the 
group in question must be both "organized" and "armed." With regard to the or-
ganized criterion, Article 1 of Additional Protocol I refers to a group that is "under 
responsible command." This phrase is explicatory of the notion of organization. 
The ICRC commentary to the article explains that 
[tJhe existence of a responsible command implies some degree of organization of the 
insurgent armed group or dissident armed forces, but this does not necessarily mean 
that there is a hierarchical system of military organization similar to that of regular 
armed fo rces. It means an organization capable, on the one hand, of planning and car-
rying out sustained and concerted military operations, and on the other, of imposing 
discipline in the name of a de facto authority.60 
The ICfY dealt with the issue of the threshold level of organization in the case of 
Limaj. In assessing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Trial Chamber held that 
some degree of organisation by the parties will suffice to establish the existence of an 
armed conflict. This degree need not be the same as that required for establishing the 
responsibility of superiors for the acts of their subordinates within the organisation, as 
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no determination of individual criminal responsibility is intended under this provision 
of the Statute.61 
It went on to d te an JCRC docwnent submitted to the Preparatory Commission 
for the Rome Statute's elements of crimes, which stated that armed conflict "pre-
supposes the existence of hostilities between armed forces organised to a greater or 
lesser extent. "62 Looking to factors like the existence of a general staff and headquar-
ters, designated military zones, adoption of internal regulations, the appointment 
of a spokesperson, coordinated military actions, recruitment activities, the wear of 
uniforms and negotiations with the other side,63 the Chamber concluded that the 
KLA was an organized armed group,64 a determination consistent with those in 
other cases examining the same issue.6s 
Similarly, in the Haradinaj case the ICfY surveyed all previous judgments rele-
vant to the issue of organization before concluding that no single factor was neces-
sarily determinative. Rather, the Trial Chamber suggested a holistic approach. 
Illustrative factors that bore on organization included 
existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the abil-
ityof the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and mili-
tary training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including 
troop movements and logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use 
military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude 
agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords.66 
These cases suggest two indispensable elements of the "organized" criterion. To 
begin with, the group in question must exhibit a degree of structure. The structure 
need not be strictly hierarchical or implemented in any formalistic manner, al-
though such factors are highly indicative of the required organizational robustness. 
For instance, many non-military organized anned groups have flat and decentral-
ized structures. Yet, as has been noted elsewhere, while such organizational models 
may complicate identification of a group's members, "operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq demonstrate that these challenges are not insurmountable. "67 Nor need 
an organized armed group have explicit ranks, wear distinctive emblems, operate 
from established bases or recruit in a particular fashion. 
That said, a group that is transitory or ad hoc in nature does not qualify; in other 
words, an organized armed group can never simply consist of those who are engag-
ing in hostilities against the State, sans plus. It must be a distinct entity that the 
other side can label the "enemy" for reasons ranging from the development of field 
strategy and tactics to the conduct of negotiations. A qualifying group must also be 
capable of exercising some degree of control over the activities of its members. In 
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particular, it must be sufficiently organized to enforce compliance with LOAC, 
although failure to actually do so does not bar qualification as an organized armed 
groUp.68 
Additionally, to be "organized," a group must be able to act in a coordinated 
fashion, albeit not to the extent of the regular armed forces. This requirement im-
plies an ability to plan and execute group activities, collect and share intelligence, 
communicate among members, deconflict operations and provide logistic support 
to combat operations. Collective action alone, in the sense of multiple autonomous 
actions against the State (or another organized armed group), does not suffice; the 
actions engaged in must evidence a group character. 
The organization requirement is especially relevant in three regards. First, there 
is no non-international armed conflict equivalent of international armed conflict's 
levee en masse.69 An uprising against the government, no matter how intense, can 
only constitute a non-international armed conflict once the opposition begins to 
exhibit some degree of organization. Until then, it is an internal disturbance and 
thereby excluded from the ambit of non-international armed conflict. 
Second, an organized armed group cannot consist solely of those who share the 
same basis for opposition to the government, for they lack the requisite degree of 
organization and coordination. As an example, whereas individual terrorist groups 
in a non-international armed conflict may qualify separately as organized armed 
groups, it is only once they begin to affiliate and to coordinate their activities that 
they become a single organized armed group. Consider al Qaeda, an organized 
armed group consisting of loosely related subgroups. The fact that others may 
share al Qaeda's ideology or are inspired by the organization does not alone suffice 
to qualify them as al Qaeda members. Instead, they are either members of a sepa-
rate organized armed group, civilians directly participating in hostilities or mere 
violent criminals. Thus, there can, legally, be no such thing asa "war on terrorism" 
as such, because the generic category of terrorists cannot constitute a single party to 
an armed conflict. It is only once particular groups are somehow affiliated and plan 
or coordinate activities in concert that they may be treated as a distinct organized 
armed group. 
Third, cyber attacks have raised the possibility of virtual organization. Online 
organizations are commonplace in contemporary life. In many cases, the members 
thereof never physically meet. They may not even know the identities of other 
members. If a collection of online hackers conducts related operations against a 
government (assuming such operations rise to the level of armed actions as a mat-
ter oflaw), can it meet the organization criterion? Along similar lines, can persons 
who conduct kinetic actions as members of a group constituted and coordinating 
entirely online make up an organized armed group? 
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Individuals operating autonomously, even if targeting the same State entities, 
are not an o rganized armed group. There is no organizational element and their 
actions lack coordination. A similar conclusion would hold with regard to individ-
uals who operate collectively, but not cooperatively. During the cyber attacks 
against Georgia in 2008, for example, a website appeared containing hacker tools 
and a list of Georgian government and civilian targets.70 Using that site, hundreds 
of individuals began conducting individual attacks. Again, the absence of organi-
zation and of cooperative activities would preclude characterization of the attack-
ers as members of an organized armed group. 
On the other hand, a virtual group can have a specific leadership and organiza-
tional structure and conduct highly synchronized cyber operations. The only ap-
parent obstacle to qualification as an organized armed group would appear to be 
the requirement that organizational structure allow for enforcement of LOAC. 
There is presently no consensus as to whether the difficulty a virtual group would 
have enforcing LOAC precludes qualification as an organized armed group, such 
that the virtual members would at most qualify as civilian direct participants. 
The second criterion of an organized armed group is that it be "armed." Logi-
cally, a group is armed when it has the capacity to carry out "attacks," defined in 
LOAC as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in de-
fence."71 Such acts must be based on the group's intentions, not those of individual 
members. This conclusion derives from the fact that while many members of the 
armed forces have no violent function, the armed forces as a whole are nevertheless 
"armed" as a matter of LOAC.72 Conversely, the mere fact that certain members of 
a group participate in hostilities does not render the group "armed" absent a 
shared purpose of carrying out the qualifying attacks. 
More problematic is a group that does not itself carry out attacks, but performs 
acts that amount to direct participation in hostilities, such as collecting tactical in-
telligence for use by other groups in specifi c attacks. To the extent that acts consti-
tuting direct participation render individual civilians subject to attack, it is a 
reasonable extrapolation to conclude that a group with a purpose of directly partic-
ipating in the hostilities is "armed." Of course, such groups could only exist in the 
context of a non-international armed conflict in which another group was con-
ducting attacks, fo r without attacks there is no armed conflict in the first place. 
The one area of potential difficulty with regard to the anned criterion involves 
groups that engage in cyber operations. By the approach taken above, a group of 
this kind would have to be mounting operations that rose to the level of a cyber "at-
tack" as a matter oflaw or otherwise be engaging in cyber activities that amounted, 
as discussed, to direct participation in either cyber or kinetic attacks. While dis-
agreement exists as to which cyber operations constitute attacks under LOAC,73 
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there is consensus that any cyber operation resulting in injury to or death ofinru-
viduals or damage to or destruction of objects qualifies. There is also agreement 
that cybcr activities that merely cause inconvenience or irritation do not. 
Certain organized groups consist of both armed and non-armed wings. This is 
the case, for instance, with Hamas and Hezbollah. It is generally accepted that 
when the group in question is composed of subgroups, only those that engage in 
hostili ties qualify as organized armed groups. Individuals who straddle both wings, 
such as the overall leader, are members of the armed subgroup, notwithstanding 
their non-hostile roles. 
Controversy surrounds one aspect of status as a member of an organized armed 
group. Specifically, the question is who among the members may be attacked when 
not directly engaged in hostilities. A restrictive view, represented by the Interpretive 
Guidance, adopts the notion of "continuous combat function" as the key to mem-
bership. The term is defmed as a "continuous function for the group involving his 
or her direct participation in hostilities. "74 
Although the question of which acts qualify as "direct participation" is itself 
somewhat contentious,7s the issue need not be explored here. Suffice it to say that 
by the Guidance standard only those with a continuous combat function may be 
treated as members of an organized armed group and therefore attackable at any 
time during the period of their membership. Absent such a function, individuals 
affiliated with the group are to be treated as civilians who can only be attacked for 
such time as they participate in the hostilities.76 
In justification, the Interpretive Guidance correctly notes the difficulty during a 
non-international armed conflict of distinguishing civilians from members of or-
ganized armed groups, and points to the fact that membership in an organized 
armed group is seldom formalized, "other than taking up a certain function for the 
group."n Groups may not wear uniforms, operate from fixed bases or fight em-
ploying classic military tactics and they are often organized informally and operate 
clandestinely. Complicating matters is the reality that civilians in the battlespace 
may carry weapons for their own protection. Therefore the requirement of contin-
uous combat function, by setting a high bar for membership, appears to afford the 
civilian population enhanced protection from mistaken attacks. 
These concerns are valid, but, for both practical and normative reasons, over-
stated. In fact, organized armed groups often have a membership structure based 
on more than mere function. Members frequently wear uniforms or other distin-
guishing garb and may operate from ftxed bases, especially when in control of terri-
tory or operating from remote locations.18 For example, the Red Army, Hamas, 
Hezbollah, FARC, Tamil Tigers and KLA were often distinguishable from the civil-
ian population and operated in a manner not unlike the regular armed forces. 
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Membership may also be confirmed by intelligence ranging from human sources 
and communications intercepts to captured documents and interrogation of cap-
tured fighters. So, from a practical perspective, it is frequently a relatively simple 
matter to discriminate between civilians and members of organized armed groups. 
When it is not, the law itself takes account of the uncertainty. Article 50.1 of Addi-
tional Protocol I, a provision generally deemed reflective of customary interna-
tional law in both international armed conflicts and non-international armed 
conflicts,~ provides that "[ i]n case of doubt whether a person isa civilian, that per-
son shall be considered to be a civilian." 
The result of the continuous combat function criterion is therefore inequity in 
the law. By the proposed standard, direct attack on a member of an organized 
armed group without a continuous combat function is prohibited (indeed, such an 
attack would bea war crime since the individual qualifies as a civilian), but a mem-
ber of the State's armed forces who performs no combat-related duties may be at-
tacked at any time. This is a rather curious result in light of the fact that the 
organized armed group lacks any domestic or international legal basis for 
participation in the conflict in the first place. The standard badly skews the bal-
ance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations that undergirds 
all ofLOAC.8(1 
A more reasoned approach, and one that better comports with the underlying 
logic of the distinction between civilians and organized armed groups, is to simply 
treat insurgent fighters and members of the armed fo rces equally. By it, members 
of organized armed groups may be attacked so long as they remain active members 
of the group, regardless of their function. It makes no more sense to treat an indi-
vidual who joins a group that has the express purpose of conducting hostilities as a 
civilian than it would to differentiate between the various members of the regular 
armed forces . After all, and as noted in the Interpretive Guidatlce itself (albeit in the 
context of international armed conflict ), 
it would contradict the logic of the principle of distinction to place irregular armed 
forces under the more protective legal regime afforded to the civilian population 
merely because they fail to distinguish themselves from that population. to carry their 
arms openly, or to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. Therefore, even under the terms of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Con-
ventions. all armed actors showing a sufficient degree of military organization and be-
longing to a party to the conflict must be regarded as part of the armed forces of that 
party.Sl 
A fmal issue with regard to organized armed groups in non-international armed 
conflicts involves mixed conflicts, that is, conflicts with both international and 
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non-international components. The Interpretive Guidance raises this prospect in 
its assertion that "organized armed groups operating within the broader context of 
an international armed conflict without belonging to a party to that conflict could 
still be regarded as parties to a separate non-international armed conflict. "82 A 
group belongs to a party when at least a de facto relationship exists between the 
group and the party to the international armed conflict. Mere tacit agreement suf-
fices so long as it is clear for which side the group is fighting. 83 The basis for the po-
sition is straightforward-since only States may be party to an international armed 
conflict, a non-State group would have to be affiliated with a State to qualify as a 
party. By contrast, non-international armed conflict necessarily involves at least 
one party that is not a State or otherwise an extension thereof. 
The prospect of groups appearing in the battlespace that do not belong to any of 
the parties to an international armed conflict is far from hypothetical. For instance, 
during the international armed conflict phases in Afghanistan and Iraq, coalition 
troops regularly faced forces that were not allied with the Taliban or the Baathist 
regimes. In particular, certain Shia militia groups in Iraq opposed both the coali-
tion forces and those of the Iraqi government in the hope of eventually seizing 
power themselves. 
From a practical perspective, an approach that automatically renders hostilities 
with a non-affiliated organized armed group as a separate non-international 
armed conflict is problematic in that it requires application of separate bodies of 
law to colocated hostilities. Therefore, an argument can be made that it is prefera-
ble to ask whether there is an unambiguous nexus between the actions of the group 
in question and the international armed conflict. S4 If so, the law applicable in inter-
national armed conflict would continue to govern hostilities with the group. Ifnot, 
the group would qualify as an organized armed group in a non-international 
armed conflict. 
Regardless of one's position on this specific issue, there are undoubtedly situa-
tions in which international and non-international conflicts coexist.8s For in-
stance, a non-international armed conflict may survive in a situation where an 
international armed conflict breaks out. In Afghanistan, non-international armed 
conflict between the Taliban-Ied Afghan government and the Northern Alliance 
was under way at the time coalition forces began operations in 2001. Until the co-
alition exercised "overall control" of Northern Alliance operations, that conflict 
continued alongside the international armed conflict between the coalition States 
and Afghanistan.86 
Despite the complexity of classifying conflict, it is important to emphasize the 
fact that classification of participants in such conflicts tracks the criteria normally 
applied in the two types of confli cts. The fact that an international armed conflict is 
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ongoing in the same battlespace and at the same time as a non-international armed 
conflict has no bearing on qualification of any groups involved in the latter as 
"organized armed groups." 
Civilians Who Directly Participate in Hostilities 
The final category of fighters in armed opposition to the government comprises in-
dividuals who are members of neither dissident armed forces nor any other orga-
nized groups. Their activities alone cannot constitute a non-international armed 
conflict, for such a conflict cannot exist without an organized armed group on at 
least one side. Thus, the category of directly participating civilians only has mean-
ing in the context of an ongoing non-international armed conflict. 
Individuals "who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, 
sporadic or unorganized basis" make up the category.87 Examples include those 
who engage in individual acts for pay (e.g., a fee for emplacement of improvised ex-
plosive devices (lEOs)) or for other reasons unrelated to group affiliation, as well as 
groups of individuals who take part in the hostilities without prior organization 
and coordination (as in a mob that attacks a military facility). By the Interpretive 
Guidance's approach, the category would extend to those members of an armed 
group who do not have a contin uous combat function , but which at times take up 
arms or engage in other acts amounting to direct participation. 
The topic of direct participation in hostilities has been the subject of extensive 
and lively discourse in the literature and need only be summarized here.S8 It is an 
important debate, for, unlike members of the dissident armed forces and other or-
ganized armed groups, direct participants may only be attacked while they engage 
in acts of participation. As noted in Additional Protocol II, Article 13.3, civilians 
enjoy protection from attack, "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities." Resultantly, the options for targeting them are dramatically reduced. 
With regard to the concept of direct participation, two questions are key: ( I ) 
what acts qualify a civilian as a direct participant in hostilities; and (2) when is he or 
she participating? The Interpretive Guidance proffers three cumulative "constitu-
tive elements" of acts that constitute direct participation. 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capac-
ityof a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruc-
tion on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold ofhann), and 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result ei-
ther from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act consti-
tutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
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3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of 
harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent 
nexus).89 
These cri teria generally capture the essence of direct participation, although 
there is some disagreement with the standards around the margins.90 For instance, 
the firs t criterion could be expanded to encompass acts that enhance one's own 
military capacity, rather than merely negatively affecting the enemy. Further, the 
causal link as explained in the Guidance is overly restrictive.91 As an example, it ex-
cludes assembly of an improvised explosive device on the basis that such participa-
tion is indirect.92 This assertion flies in the face of common sense; no State that 
engages in combat could reasonably accept it. The Guidance also labels voluntary 
human shielding as indirect, a position that is likewise highly questionable.93 De-
spite such concerns, the three elements fairly capture what is generally understood 
to be direct participation-acts that militarily affect the parties in a fairly direct 
manner and that are related to the ongoing armed conflict. 
Much more problematic is the question of when may direct participation be 
said to be happening, for a civilian only loses imm unity from attack during that pe-
riod. At issue is the "for such time" verbiage in the direct participation norm, 
which is properly characterized as customary in nature.94 
The Interpretive Guidance asserts that "measures preparatory to the execution of 
a specific ad of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and 
the return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of the 
act."95 However, many of the experts involved in the project of developing the 
Guidance argued for a broader interpretation of "preparatory," such that the period 
of participation should extend as far before and after a hostile action as a causal 
connection existed.96 As an example, the b roader approach would include assem-
bling an lED and perhaps even acquiring the necessary materials. 
There was also significant objection to the Interpretive Guidance's assertion that 
individuals who participate in hostilities on a recurrent basis regain protection 
from attack between their operations, losing it again only upon launching the next 
attack. This dynamic has become known as the "revolving door," which the Guid-
ance somewhat curiously suggests is an "integral part, not a malfunction of lHL. "97 
The approach flies in the face of military common sense and accordingly repre-
sents a distortion of LOAC's military advantagelhumanitarian considerations bal-
ance. This is especially so in the context of irregular warfare, where clandestine 
activities by insurgent groups are common. Again, consider the case of an IED attack. 
If the insurgent is discovered deploying to the attack location, implanting the lED 
or returning from the operation, the attack will likely be foiled since lED attacks are 
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usually only successful when the devices can be laid secretly. As a result, the best 
option for countering future attacks is through heuristic intelligence analysis, 
which would reveal patterns ofIED-implanting activities that allow for pinpoint-
ing those involved through human and technical intelligence. Yet by the Interpre-
tive Guidance position, they could not be attacked until launching the next 
operation, an unacceptable result militarily. 
The only viable approach is one in which a civilian who directly participates in 
hostilities on a recurring basis remains targetable until he or she opts out of the 
hostilities in an unambiguous manner. There is, of course, a risk that a direct par-
ticipant might actually have decided to cease all hostile activities without the 
knowledge of the forces he or she has been attacking. But it is more sensible to have 
the participant, who enjoyed no right to participate in the first place, bear the risk 
of mistake rather than his or her former victims. The requirement to presume civil-
ian status in the event of reasonable doubt further mitigates this risk. 
Conclusions 
In a non-international armed conflict, opposition fighters can be divided into two 
categories-members of an organized armed group and civilian direct participants 
in hostilities. The former category includes dissident armed forces and other 
groups that are both "organized" and "armed." The argument that a member of an 
organized armed group must be treated as a civilian if he or she does not have a 
continuous combat function in the group was rejected as both impractical and 
contrary to the logic of the law. 
The result of this binary classification is that there is no LOAC prohibition on 
attacking members of organized armed groups at any time, just as there is no inter-
national law prohibition on attacking members of the government's forces.% Only 
when dealing with a fighter who is unaffiliated with a group, and who is therefore a 
civilian temporarily deprived of protection as such, does a temporal limitation 
arise. This approach accords neatly with the foundational premise of the law of 
armed conflict-that the law must balance military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations. Further parsing of the prevailing binary classification or otherwise 
complicating it will only serve to confuse matters in what is perhaps the most con-
fusing genre of conflict-that which is non-international. 
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